01 // BLUF
Bottom Line Up Front
01
Strategic intent, not spillover. JNIM's expansion into Benin and Togo is a deliberate strategic push. Both states now sit on the active frontline of the jihadist southern advance.
02
Escalating casualties. Togo recorded 52 deaths from ten attacks in 2024. Benin suffered 28 soldiers killed in early January 2025 alone, near the Burkina Faso-Niger border.
03
Internal fractures emerging. A thwarted coup attempt in Benin on 7 December 2025, mounted by military officers citing the deteriorating northern security situation, shows that external threat pressure is now activating internal political fractures.
04
Security dominance is self-undermining. Both governments have defaulted to a security-heavy posture while neglecting the political, economic, and social conditions that make communities vulnerable to recruitment. This is generating diminishing returns and new grievances.
05
Governance competition has begun. JNIM has shifted strategy toward territorial administration — controlling territory, establishing governance structures, and cultivating local support. Conventional military responses alone cannot counter this.
06
Dual-track response required. Stability requires hardening the security perimeter in the short term while investing urgently in governance presence, economic integration, and community trust in the north over the medium term.
02 // SNAPSHOT
Situation Snapshot
Who
Govts of Togo & Benin, JNIM, IS Sahel, ECOWAS, Accra Initiative, France, United States
What
Sustained jihadist infiltration of northern border zones, combined with political fragility in both capitals
Where
Northern Togo (Savanes); northern Benin (Atacora, Alibori); W-Arly-Pendjari tri-border park complex
When
Active escalation since 2019 (Benin) and 2021 (Togo); acceleration through 2024–2025; political flashpoint December 2025
Why
Limited service delivery, anti-govt disinformation, intercommunal tensions, and absent economic opportunity in border regions
How
Extremists leveraged farmer-pastoralist disputes and livestock movement restrictions to recruit and establish footholds
03 // KEY JUDGMENTS
Key Judgments
High
KJ-1
JNIM's southern expansion is strategic and durable. JNIM's hybrid governance model — imposing local taxes, settling disputes, restricting cross-border commerce — represents the most significant threat trajectory for 2026. Military pressure alone will not reverse this.
High
KJ-2
Benin faces a compounded threat. The December 2025 coup attempt indicates that security failures in the north are now generating political fractures inside the state apparatus, creating a dangerous feedback loop between external threat and internal instability.
Moderate
KJ-3
Togo's governance response is self-undermining. The extended state of emergency in Savanes has been used to arbitrarily detain people on ethnic grounds, suppressing citizen advocacy and community trust networks critical to counter-insurgency.
Moderate
KJ-4
Western military withdrawal has created a security vacuum. The shift toward alternative partnerships is observable regionally. Neither Togo nor Benin has pivoted to Russia, but their options are narrowing as external support frameworks fragment.
Moderate
KJ-5
Regional coordination architecture is structurally insufficient. Overlapping AU, ECOWAS, and AES mandates produce acute institutional fragmentation. The ECOWAS Rapid Deployment Force at 1,650 personnel is symbolic, not deterrent.
04 // EVIDENCE
Evidence Summary
✓ What We Know (Facts)
- Violent events within 50km of coastal West African borders up over 250% in two years, surpassing 450 incidents
- Benin coup attempt 7 Dec 2025, thwarted with ECOWAS/Nigeria support
- Togo: 52 deaths in 2024; Benin: 173 deaths in past year
- Togo 2024 constitutional amendments consolidated executive authority under Gnassingbé
- Togo CIPLEV and Benin CLTIF established with U.S. support as prevention bodies
~ What We Assess (Inferences)
- JNIM governance competition in the north likely outpaces state service delivery in those zones
- Benin military grievances over northern deployments are latent and could resurface
- Togo's constitutional consolidation may reduce incentive to invest in marginalised northern populations
- U.S. policy posture shift may reduce coastal West Africa stabilisation commitment
△ What We Don't Know (Gaps)
- Granular JNIM recruitment rates and command node locations inside both countries
- True extent of community collaboration vs. coerced compliance with extremist groups
- Whether Trump administration will maintain or reduce SPCPS framework commitments
- Real-time JNIM administrative reach inside WAP park corridor
05 // ANALYSIS
Analysis
Five-Layer Strategic Cognition Mapping
L1
Foundations
Two coastal states with historically moderate governance records, now under sustained jihadist pressure. Both have functioning capitals and coastal economies. Both have weak state presence in northern border regions — the foundational vulnerability JNIM exploits.
L2
Mechanisms
Violent extremist groups exploit weak governance, marginalisation, and local grievances. Youth unemployment, pastoral-farmer land conflicts, and geographic marginalisation are the primary recruitment levers. JNIM's governance provision model accelerates community defection from the state where the state is absent.
L3
Dynamics
A compounding feedback loop is active: crackdowns generate resentment → resentment reduces intelligence cooperation → degraded effectiveness increases attacks → attacks generate pressure for more crackdowns. JNIM explicitly threatens reprisals against cooperating civilians, locking communities into forced neutrality that disadvantages the state over time.
L4
Leverage
Three primary leverage points: (1) governance extension into northern zones through service delivery, not only security presence; (2) cross-border intelligence coordination via Accra Initiative; (3) economic integration of northern border communities into national supply chains.
L5
Paradigms
Both governments frame violent extremism as an external import requiring border security, often alongside rhetoric targeting Fulani populations. This framing is analytically incorrect and operationally counterproductive. The required paradigm shift: reframe as a domestic governance deficit, not a foreign invasion.
Scenario Modeling
Scenario A — Best Case
Probability: Low–Moderate
Stabilisation Pathway
Both govts accelerate governance investment in the north, integrating civil society into counter-extremism programming. ECOWAS RDF deploys along key infiltration corridors. JNIM's territorial ambitions are disrupted before governance structures entrench.
Triggers: Sustained political will in both capitals; U.S. and European funding continuation; Accra Initiative intelligence-sharing breakthrough.
Triggers: Sustained political will in both capitals; U.S. and European funding continuation; Accra Initiative intelligence-sharing breakthrough.
Scenario B — Base Case
Probability: Moderate–High
Managed Deterioration
Both govts maintain security-dominant approach with marginal governance investment. Attacks continue increasing. Northern populations remain caught between security forces and JNIM. A second coup attempt in Benin within 18–24 months if northern conditions don't visibly improve.
Triggers: No governance investment announcement; continued state of emergency renewal without civilian spending.
Triggers: No governance investment announcement; continued state of emergency renewal without civilian spending.
Scenario C — Worst Case
Probability: Low–Moderate, rising
Cascading Fragility
A major JNIM urban attack or successful coup triggers institutional crisis. One or both govts pivot toward Russian security partnerships. ECOWAS cohesion fractures further. Refugee flows accelerate toward coastal cities. Maritime security in Lomé and Cotonou deteriorates.
Triggers: Mass-casualty urban attack; successful second coup; Russia bilateral security visit.
Triggers: Mass-casualty urban attack; successful second coup; Russia bilateral security visit.
Indicators & Warnings
| Indicator | Direction | Threshold | Status | Cadence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JNIM attacks — Savanes (Togo) | Increasing | >3 attacks/month | Amber | Monthly |
| JNIM attacks — Atacora/Alibori (Benin) | Increasing | >4 attacks/month | Red | Monthly |
| IDP displacement — both countries north | Increasing | >50,000 new IDP | Amber | Quarterly |
| Military grievance signals (Benin) | Latent | Any public statement citing deployment conditions | Amber | Ongoing |
| Togo Savanes emergency extension | Recurring | 3rd consecutive extension with no governance investment | Red | Biannual |
| ECOWAS RDF deployment status | Delayed | No deployment by Q3 2026 | Amber | Quarterly |
| Accra Initiative joint operations | Declining | No joint operation in 6 months | Amber | Biannual |
| Russia security partnership signals | Emerging | Official bilateral security visit | Green | Ongoing |
06 // BEHAVIORAL
Applied Behavioral Tradecraft
Behavioral Risk Drivers (Ranked)
Influence & Narrative Vulnerabilities
Civil society and media actors in both countries are largely excluded from counter-extremism architecture, with media used primarily to publicise government activity rather than as a genuine community engagement channel. This limits the state's narrative reach into affected communities precisely where it is most needed.
Pastoralists and Fula community members are widely perceived as connected to extremists, creating a stigmatisation dynamic that accelerates radicalisation among the very groups most important to win over. This framing, reinforced by security rhetoric in both capitals, is analytically counterproductive.
07 // RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations
0–72h
Signal institutional cohesion: Issue a joint Togo-Benin statement reaffirming ECOWAS partnership and Accra Initiative commitment in response to the December 2025 coup attempt.
Establish baseline: Commission an internal audit of northern governance service delivery gaps in both countries to anchor medium-term investment targeting.
Intelligence briefing: Request a classified brief from Accra Initiative partners on current JNIM command node locations in both countries to inform near-term targeting priorities.
3–30 days
Togo: Announce a credible governance investment package for Savanes to accompany any state of emergency renewal — demonstrating that security measures are paired with visible state presence: health posts, market infrastructure, local administration.
Benin: Conduct a structured civil-military review of northern deployment conditions to address the grievances that motivated the December coup attempt before they resurface at higher intensity.
Cross-border protocol: Activate bilateral Togo-Benin intelligence-sharing on JNIM movements in the WAP corridor, which currently functions as a cross-border operational safe zone.
30–180 days
Civil society integration: Formally integrate civil society organisations — particularly those with presence in northern communities — into CIPLEV and CLTIF operational planning as design partners, not just committee seats.
Narrative reframe: Shift public-facing counter-extremism communications from "foreign threat" to "northern development and security" framing that engages community grievances rather than stigmatising Fulani and pastoral populations.
ECOWAS advocacy: Prioritise Togo and Benin border zones in the 2026 RDF deployment footprint, ensuring the force is not concentrated solely in AES-adjacent areas.
Pastoral protocol: Establish a cross-border pastoral movement protocol between Togo and Benin that regularises livestock movement and removes a key JNIM recruitment lever.
08 // CONFIDENCE
Confidence & Uncertainties
Overall Confidence Assessment
MODERATE
Attack data from ACLED and UN Security Council reporting is strong and corroborated across multiple independent source streams.
Governance deficit analysis is well-supported by ISS Africa field research and cross-validated by Foreign Policy and Africa Center assessments.
JNIM strategic intent assessed with high confidence based on claimed operations and documented governance behaviour in Mali and Burkina Faso. Confidence capped at Moderate due to absence of granular field data on recruitment rates and current U.S. policy trajectory.
Three Uncertainties That Could Flip the Assessment
U.S. policy continuity: If the current administration withdraws the Biden-era SPCPS framework ($100M+ committed), the capacity-building programs underpinning both CIPLEV and CLTIF would be materially degraded, accelerating toward Scenario C.
Second coup attempt in Benin: If military grievances are not addressed and a second attempt succeeds, regional dynamics shift dramatically. ECOWAS intervention would be tested at scale for the first time in a high-threat environment.
JNIM urban expansion: A mass-casualty attack in a secondary city — rather than rural border zones — could collapse public confidence in both governments rapidly, triggering emergency measures that further erode civil liberties and community trust.
09 // REFERENCES
Source Register & WSI Audit
| # | Source | Type | Band |
|---|---|---|---|
| [1] | ACLED: Conflict Intensifies Beyond Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (2025) | Conflict Data / OSINT | Green |
| [2] | UN Security Council: West Africa and the Sahel — April 2025 Forecast | Intergovernmental | Green |
| [3] | UN Security Council: West Africa and the Sahel — November 2025 Forecast | Intergovernmental | Green |
| [4] | African Security Analysis: UN Security Council Forecast November 2025 | Analytical Secondary | Amber |
| [5] | ISS Africa: Civilian-State Security Cooperation in Benin and Togo | Field Research | Green |
| [6] | Chatham House: West Africa Needs Regional Solutions (December 2025) | Policy Analysis | Green |
| [7] | Africa Center for Strategic Studies: Recalibrating Coastal West Africa's Response (Oct 2024) | Policy Analysis | Green |
| [8] | Foreign Policy: Islamist Extremists Are a Threat to Ghana, Togo, and Benin (Sept 2024) | Analytical Journalism | Amber |
| [9] | ISS Africa: Evidence Must Guide Terrorism Prevention in Benin and Togo | Field Research | Green |
| [10] | UN Press: Security Council Briefing — West Africa, December 2025 | Official Record | Green |
| [11] | INIS Webinar Report: Security Challenges in West Africa (December 2025) | Academic / Policy | Amber |
| [12] | UNDP: Prevention Facility for the Gulf of Guinea (2025) | UN Development | Green |
Independence test applied: Key judgments on JNIM expansion, attack frequency, and governance deficit are corroborated by at least three independent source streams (ACLED data, UN reporting, ISS Africa field research, and Africa Center policy analysis). No single-source key judgment is present without explicit caveat.