Sudan Conflict Assessment | Quanta Analytica Process™

01 BLUF — Bottom Line Up Front

B1 Sudan's civil war has entered a strategically decisive phase: the SAF has recaptured Khartoum and key Kordofan cities while the RSF holds Darfur and its parallel government. De facto partition is now operationally real, not merely theoretical.

B2 Famine is confirmed in Al Fasher and Kadugli and at famine-threshold malnutrition levels in at least two additional North Darfur localities. The WFP will exhaust food stocks in Sudan by end of March 2026. This constitutes an acute mass-casualty risk within weeks, not months.

B3 The conflict has fully regionalised: Egypt conducts airstrikes in support of the SAF; the UAE finances and arms the RSF; a Reuters-confirmed Ethiopian training camp hosts approximately 4,300 RSF-aligned fighters; Saudi Arabia has abandoned its mediator role and is now backing the SAF. The Saudi-UAE proxy rift structurally reduces ceasefire probability.

B4 The Kordofan front is the current operational center of gravity. RSF drone strikes on civilian markets and health facilities are near-daily. SAF advances are creating displacement cascades of hundreds of thousands; both dynamics accelerate famine spread into Greater Kordofan.

B5 The 2026 Sudan humanitarian response plan requires $2.9 billion and has received only 5.5% of required funding. US USAID capacity reductions, combined with UAE and Saudi pledges, create a structurally mismatched response architecture that favors political leverage over humanitarian need.

B6 No credible ceasefire mechanism exists. The Quad format (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt) is now fractured by the Saudi-UAE rupture. Diplomatic momentum is at its lowest point since the war began.

02 Situation Snapshot

Who

SAF (Gen. al-Burhan) vs. RSF (Gen. Hemedti / Dagalo); allied proxy networks including Egypt, Iran, Eritrea, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (SAF side); UAE, Ethiopia (RSF side). Civilian population: ~48 million.

What

Full-scale civil war, now in Year 3, involving ground offensives, drone campaigns, aerial bombardment, proxy arms flows, parallel governance structures, deliberate aid obstruction, and confirmed famine.

Where (Active Fronts)

Primary: Kordofan region (North and South). Secondary: Darfur consolidation (RSF holds El Fasher since Oct 2025). Tertiary: Khartoum stabilization (SAF, post-recapture March 2025), Gezira State, Blue Nile. Cross-border: Ethiopian border (Al-Fashaga), Chadian border (displacement corridors), Libyan border (weapons transit).

When

War began 15 April 2023 (Day 1,063 as of 13 Mar 2026). Current assessment window: October 2025 – March 2026. Critical near-term threshold: end of March 2026 (WFP stock depletion).

Why (Root Drivers)

RSF-SAF integration dispute; control of Sudan's gold economy; competing legitimacy claims post-2021 coup; external patron interests in Red Sea access, gold flows, and regional influence projection.

How (Current Modalities)

Near-daily drone strikes on civilian infrastructure; ground offensives in Kordofan; continued RSF predation and looting in Darfur; both sides blocking aid access; parallel administration structures sustaining war economies.

As of 13 March 2026, Sudan is approaching a strategic inflection point. The SAF's recapture of Khartoum (March 2025) and the RSF's seizure and consolidation of El Fasher (October 2025) have produced a de facto territorial partition: the SAF controls the east, the capital corridor, and is advancing in Kordofan; the RSF controls a broad western arc from Darfur into West Kordofan. Neither side is close to decisive military victory. Both are prosecuting campaigns that systematically destroy the civilian support base needed for any future state.

03 Key Judgments

01

Sudan is experiencing active genocide-risk conditions in Darfur; RSF atrocities post-El Fasher meet multiple threshold criteria

The RSF seizure of El Fasher (Oct 2025) was followed by mass killings of fleeing civilians, ethnically motivated displacement, and famine-as-weapon conditions confirmed by the IPC in El Fasher localities. The UN described El Fasher as a "crime scene." The combination of ethnic targeting (Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa populations), systematic sexual violence, and deliberate destruction of food and water systems exceeds conflict collateral damage and constitutes likely atrocity crimes under international law. ICC investigations are active but enforcement capacity is absent.

High Confidence

02

Famine will spread significantly before end of Q2 2026 without immediate ceasefire and mass aid delivery

IPC famine confirmed in Al Fasher and Kadugli. Famine-threshold malnutrition surpassed in Um Baru (52.9% child acute malnutrition, nearly twice famine threshold) and Kernoi (34%) in North Darfur. Greater Kordofan conditions are rapidly deteriorating. WFP food stocks will be exhausted by end of March 2026. The 2026 humanitarian response plan is only 5.5% funded. The lean season and rainy season beginning April-June will structurally worsen access and food production. Analyst inference: absent a ceasefire or a dramatic funding and access shift, famine-related mortality will measurably increase in Q2 2026.

High Confidence

03

The Saudi-UAE proxy rupture is the single most structurally destabilizing diplomatic development of the past six months

Saudi Arabia's shift from nominal mediator to active SAF backer, driven by the broader Gulf rift over Yemen, has collapsed the Quad format as a functional mechanism. Saudi-aligned media now openly names UAE as conflict enabler. UAE formally denies all RSF support, but Reuters confirmed UAE-financed Ethiopian training camps for RSF-aligned fighters. The proxy competition now tracks the Gulf rift dynamic, meaning external de-escalation pressure is effectively zero absent US intervention — which itself faces internal credibility questions under the current administration.

High Confidence

04

A decisive SAF military victory in Kordofan is possible but not probable within the next 90 days

The SAF has reorganized, redeployed forces, and achieved the Kadugli siege break. Al Jazeera reported SAF statements that any Kordofan operation would exceed the scale of the Khartoum recapture. The RSF is simultaneously intensifying attacks on El Obeid (North Kordofan capital). Momentum favors SAF in central Sudan but RSF drone capabilities and Darfur consolidation mean the RSF retains asymmetric disruption capacity. Full Kordofan control within 90 days is assessed as possible (30-35%) but not probable — the more likely outcome is a protracted Kordofan campaign extending through mid-2026 with significant civilian cost.

Moderate Confidence

05

The conflict's regionalization creates meaningful risk of a wider Horn of Africa destabilization cascade

Ethiopia's border incursions, Egyptian airstrikes, the Chad displacement corridor absorbing 4+ million refugees, and South Sudan's own food security deterioration (driven partly by Sudanese displacement) are accumulating into a multi-state fragility cluster. Crisis Group's Sudan analysts describe the conflict as "steadily regionalising into the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea." The risk of multiple regional conflict systems merging — with Sudan as epicenter — is assessed as a non-negligible tail risk (15-20% probability within 18 months) if fighting extends at current intensity.

Moderate Confidence

04 Evidence Summary

What We Know (Facts)

SAF recaptured Khartoum (March 2025); government returned to capital January 2026.

RSF seized El Fasher (Oct 26, 2025) following 18-month siege; 100,000+ fled; mass killings documented by UN.

SAF broke Kadugli siege and captured Dilling, South Kordofan, early 2026.

IPC confirmed famine in El Fasher and Kadugli; acute malnutrition in Um Baru at 52.9% (nearly double famine threshold).

WFP: will exhaust Sudan food stocks by end of March 2026. Requires $700M for January-June operations. Currently reaching ~4M people per month.

33+ million people face urgent humanitarian need; 29 million acutely food insecure (61.7% of population).

12+ million displaced total; 9M internally, 3.5M+ in neighboring countries — world's largest displacement crisis.

Reuters confirmed UAE-financed training camp in Ethiopia hosting ~4,300 RSF-aligned fighters as of January 2026.

Egypt confirmed to operate airbase on Sudan border and conduct airstrikes against RSF convoys.

2026 Sudan humanitarian response plan requires $2.9B; has received only 5.5% of funds.

Over 150,000 estimated civilian deaths through combined bombardment, massacre, starvation, and disease (Le Monde / ACLED estimates).

What We Assess (Inferences)

Analyst inference: The RSF's deliberate destruction of food systems, water infrastructure, and medical facilities in areas under its control constitutes a strategy of governance-through-denial designed to create humanitarian dependency, not accidental collateral damage.

Analyst inference: The UAE's denial of RSF support is not credible given Reuters corroboration and battlefield evidence of UAE-sourced drones. The denial is a diplomatic positioning strategy.

Analyst inference: Saudi Arabia's shift to active SAF backing is primarily driven by the Yemen-Sudan proxy dynamic and broader Gulf competition, not by principled commitment to civilian protection.

Analyst inference: Both the SAF and RSF have structural incentives to maintain the war economy. Gold resource competition, patronage networks, and war profiteering are significant impediments to any negotiated settlement.

Analyst inference: WFP's projected stock depletion by March 2026 end creates a hard humanitarian cliff. The funding gap is not administrative — it reflects donor political fatigue and competing global crises, not logistical failure.

Analyst inference: The RSF's parallel government (Nyala, South Darfur) represents a move toward formalizing partition, reducing RSF incentive to negotiate reintegration with the SAF-led state.

What We Do Not Know (Gaps)

Unknown: True casualty figures. The 150,000 estimate is widely cited but poorly verified. Actual mortality including starvation and disease may be 2-3x higher. No systematic census is possible.

Unknown: RSF internal command coherence. Whether Hemedti maintains full command authority over all RSF factions operating in Darfur, or whether sub-commanders are acting with increasing autonomy, is not established.

Unknown: The scale and nature of Turkish arms transfers, reported to have reached both sides in violation of EU/US sanctions.

Unknown: Trump administration's actual prioritization of Sudan — whether current diplomatic posture reflects strategic deprioritization or transitional policy gap.

Unknown: SAF Islamist faction strength. Washington has urged the SAF to purge Islamist hardliners; the degree to which such factions constrain SAF leadership flexibility on negotiations is not publicly established.

Unknown: Actual humanitarian access in RSF-held territory. Assessment conditions there are severely constrained. IPC itself notes that documented famine areas likely underrepresent actual conditions.

05 Analysis — Tradecraft Applied

Tradecraft applied in this assessment: Indicators & Warnings (I&W) Table; Scenario Modeling (Best/Base/Worst); Armed Actor Capability-Intent Matrix; Proxy Alignment Mapping; ACH fragments on key contested hypotheses.

ACH Note — Key Contested Hypothesis

Hypothesis A: RSF famine conditions are deliberate weapon-of-war strategy. Hypothesis B: They are incidental consequence of conflict and supply disruption. Evidence assessment: The systematic destruction of water infrastructure, deliberate convoy blockades, occupation of health facilities, and the spatial correlation between RSF control and IPC famine confirmation strongly support Hypothesis A over Hypothesis B. Confidence: Moderate-High. This distinction has significant implications for accountability and sanctions strategy.

Armed Actor Capability-Intent Matrix

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)

Gov't

Capability High conventional; expanding drone capacity; Egyptian air support

Intent Total military victory; recapture Kordofan and Darfur; reject negotiated partition

Trend Gaining momentum in central Sudan; planning large Kordofan offensive

Risk Indiscriminate airstrikes on civilian areas; Islamist faction internal leverage

Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

Paramilitary

Capability Strong asymmetric/drone; Darfur territorial control; external arms pipeline active

Intent Consolidate Darfur partition; hold Kordofan corridor; formalize parallel state

Trend Losing Kordofan ground; consolidated Darfur; increasing civilian predation

Risk Atrocity crimes; deliberate famine conditions; civilian targeting as strategy

UAE

RSF Patron

Capability Primary financial/logistics backer; drone supply; Ethiopian proxy camp financing

Intent Preserve RSF as strategic partner; secure Red Sea/Horn influence; counter Saudi dominance

Trend Escalating covert support; deniability posture publicly maintained

Risk Key driver prolonging conflict; sanctions exposure increasing

Egypt

SAF Patron

Capability Active military: confirmed border airbase, airstrikes on RSF convoys

Intent SAF victory; prevent RSF state; secure Nile water; border stability

Trend Escalating direct intervention in past 6 months

Risk Direct foreign military intervention; escalation potential if Egyptian forces take casualties

Saudi Arabia

Shifting to SAF

Capability Financial mobilization; multilateral leverage; media influence

Intent Formerly: mediation. Now: SAF backing, countering UAE influence

Trend Openly condemning UAE "interference"; no longer functioning as neutral mediator

Risk Collapse of Quad format; no remaining neutral regional mediator

Ethiopia

RSF-Adjacent

Capability Hosting UAE-financed RSF training camp; border militia activity; Al-Fashaga incursions

Intent Ambiguous — territorial opportunism in Al-Fashaga; leveraging conflict for border gains

Trend Increasing involvement; now confirmed by Reuters (Feb 2026) as direct participant

Risk Ethiopia-Sudan military confrontation; Sudan-Ethiopia war risk non-negligible

Indicators & Warnings Table

Indicator	Direction	Current Status	Threshold	Monitoring Cadence
WFP food stock level in Sudan	CRITICAL DECLINE	Depleted to minimum survival rations; projected exhaustion end of March 2026	Stock depletion = famine mortality acceleration	Weekly / WFP statements
IPC acute malnutrition phase declarations	WORSENING	Famine confirmed in 2 locales; famine-threshold in 2 more; 20 areas at risk	Any additional famine confirmation = humanitarian system failure	Monthly / IPC releases
RSF drone strike frequency on civilian infrastructure	INCREASING	"Near-daily" strikes on markets, hospitals in Kordofan (ACLED, early 2026)	Sustained daily strikes = deliberate attrition strategy	Weekly / ACLED
SAF Kordofan offensive progress	ADVANCING	Kadugli and Dilling taken; El Obeid under RSF pressure; major offensive planned	SAF capture El Obeid = potential Kordofan turning point	Weekly / Al Jazeera, Reuters
Saudi-UAE diplomatic relationship	DETERIORATING	Open rupture post-Yemen STC offensive; Saudi media openly blaming UAE on Sudan	Any rapprochement = increased ceasefire pressure on both SAF/RSF	Bi-weekly / Gulf media monitoring
Humanitarian access conditions (visas, convoy clearances)	WORSENING	OCHA: May 2025 — only 110 of 355 pending visa requests approved; backlog growing	Below 40% visa approval rate = systemic access denial	Monthly / OCHA access monitoring
Sudan humanitarian response plan funding %	CRITICALLY LOW	5.5% funded of $2.9B required (as of March 2026)	Below 15% = response system collapse likely by lean season	Monthly / OCHA Financial Tracking Service
Ethiopia-Sudan border military activity	ESCALATING	4,300 RSF-aligned fighters training at UAE-financed Ethiopian camp; border militia incursions active	Ethiopian regular force engagement = potential bilateral conflict trigger	Bi-weekly / Reuters, regional monitoring
RSF governance consolidation in Darfur	DEEPENING	Parallel government (Nyala) operational since July 2025; administrative structures developing	Formal international recognition request = partition formalization bid	Monthly
UN Security Council Sudan action	STALLED	Sanctions regime renewed Sept 2025; not expanded. P5 split: China/Russia vs P3 on SAF/RSF culpability	Any binding UNSC resolution = rare diplomatic escalation signal	Monthly / UNSC records

Scenario Modeling — 90-Day Horizon

Scenario A

Negotiated Pause

Probability: 10-15%

US applies significant diplomatic pressure on Saudi Arabia and UAE simultaneously, triggering a temporary ceasefire framework. Emergency funding closes the WFP gap before end of March. Limited humanitarian corridors open into Darfur and Kordofan. Famine mortality is contained but not reversed. No political settlement — conflict pauses, not ends.

Triggers: US-Saudi-UAE trilateral pressure alignment; emergency UNSC action; donor emergency funding surge of $500M+

Scenario B (Base Case)

Protracted Kordofan Campaign

Probability: 55-60%

SAF advances in Kordofan continue through Q2 2026, achieving partial territorial gains but no decisive victory. RSF sustains Darfur control and drone harassment. WFP food stocks collapse; significant famine-related mortality increase occurs in Darfur and Kordofan. Proxy competition continues. No ceasefire. Humanitarian response operates below 20% of required capacity. Regional spillover risks increase but no new bilateral conflict.

Triggers: No new major diplomatic initiative; continued UAE-Saudi rift; SAF gains El Obeid but fails to consolidate Kordofan fully

Scenario C

Humanitarian Collapse and Regional Escalation

Probability: 25-30%

WFP stock depletion triggers famine mortality spike across Darfur and Kordofan in April-June. SAF launches its large Kordofan offensive; RSF responds with intensified strikes on civilian areas. Displacement reaches 15M+. Ethiopia border tensions escalate into armed exchange. Egypt increases airstrikes. South Sudan faces renewed instability from Sudanese displacement pressure. Sudan becomes a multi-actor hot war with no functional ceasefire mechanism.

Triggers: WFP operational collapse; SAF full Kordofan offensive launch; Ethiopian military incident; donor funding fails to materialize

06 Applied Behavioral Tradecraft

Behavioral tradecraft is applied here to illuminate armed actor decision-making, legitimacy narratives, and the structural dynamics that make negotiation structurally irrational for both principals.

B1

Legitimacy Contestation: Both actors are engaged in competing state-formation narratives

Al-Burhan frames the conflict as a war against "foreign interference" and "mercenaries" — repositioning the SAF as defender of Sudanese sovereignty and African territorial integrity. Hemedti and the RSF frame their parallel government as a "Government of Peace and Unity," projecting civilian governance credentials. Both narratives are designed for international consumption (donor recognition, sanctions protection) and domestic mobilization. Neither narrative creates incentive structures conducive to compromise. Each framing treats negotiation as legitimacy loss.

B2

War Economy Lock-in: Both actors have constructed patronage networks that require continued conflict to sustain

RSF gold mining and looting operations in Darfur fund a patronage structure dependent on continued RSF territorial control. SAF officers and allied Islamist networks have interests in maintaining military budget priority and resisting civilian governance re-emergence. Peace creates institutional risk for both actor-networks. This is not a misperception problem amenable to dialogue facilitation — it is a structural incentive problem requiring either external coercion or internal actor displacement.

B3

Identity Mobilization: RSF atrocities in Darfur reflect deliberately ethnically targeted strategy, not battlefield indiscipline

The spatial correlation between Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa population centers and the highest-intensity RSF atrocity incidents is consistent with ethnically driven targeting — not random or incidental violence. This mirrors RSF/Janjaweed behavioral patterns from the 2003-04 Darfur genocide. The identity-based mobilization creates recruitment and cohesion logic for RSF cadres; it also hardens victim community resistance, reducing any possibility of RSF governance legitimacy over Darfur populations. This dynamic reduces long-term RSF viability as a governance actor even if military control is maintained.

B4

External patron susceptibility: UAE and Saudi behavior is driven by competitive signaling, not Sudan policy objectives

The escalation of both Gulf powers' involvement in Sudan tracks the Gulf rift timeline, not Sudan battlefield developments. This means Sudan policy is a function of Gulf rivalry management, not independent Sudan strategic calculation. Behavioral implication: pressure on either actor exclusively (e.g., sanctioning UAE without Saudi engagement) will likely produce defensive escalation rather than de-escalation. Effective pressure requires a format that addresses both actors' core Gulf competition anxieties — which the Quad failed to do.

07 Recommendations

Immediate — 0 to 72 Hours

Activate emergency donor pledging mechanism to address WFP stock depletion before end-of-March cliff. Minimum target: $300M in bridging commitment. Donor Govts / OCHA
Issue formal UNSC Presidential Statement demanding unimpeded humanitarian access to Darfur and Kordofan famine zones. Even non-binding statements carry diplomatic signaling value in access negotiations. P3 / UK UNSC Presidency
Publish humanitarian access denial scorecard for both SAF and RSF territories to generate accountability pressure on aid obstruction — particularly visa denial data. OCHA / NGO coalition

Near-Term — 3 to 30 Days

Design a replacement diplomatic format for the failed Quad. A format that separates humanitarian access negotiations from political/military talks, with AU and UN co-convening, has higher neutrality credibility than a Saudi-UAE format now openly contaminated by proxy interests. AU PSC / UN OCHA
Expand targeted sanctions on UAE-linked RSF arms supply chains. The Reuters-confirmed Ethiopian training camp provides specific, actionable targeting data for sanctions designation. US Treasury / EU
Establish a cross-border access protocol via Chad-Darfur corridor as an alternative to SAF/RSF consent-dependent access routes. The IOM Farchana Humanitarian Hub in Chad provides an operational anchor for this approach. IOM / UNHCR / Chad Government
Engage Turkey directly on arms transfer violations (both sides) — Ankara is a NATO partner with exposure to US/EU sanction pressure and has demonstrated susceptibility to reputational signaling in comparable contexts. US State / EU External Action Service

Medium-Term — 30 to 180 Days

Support an ICC referral expansion to cover the full conflict (not only historical Darfur cases) and advocate for a dedicated Special Tribunal mechanism that can operate outside RSF/SAF territory jurisdiction. ICC / UNSC / HRC
Develop a Sudan partition contingency framework — not to endorse partition, but to have policy-ready options if de facto partition becomes permanent. Current policy vacuum on this question will produce reactive crisis management when the political moment forces the question. US NSC / EU Policy Planning
Address the structural funding architecture problem: the mismatch between UAE/Saudi political pledges ($500M UAE pledge in Feb 2026) and operational humanitarian need requires monitoring to ensure pledges translate to accessible, principled aid delivery and not politically conditioned supply. OCHA Financial Tracking / Humanitarian donors
Invest in Sudanese civil society and local responder capacity as the primary humanitarian delivery mechanism. Local actors currently represent over 1.9M people assisted via IOM's community-based approach — they are under-resourced and represent the most access-resilient delivery modality. IOM / UNHCR / USAID / EU ECHO

08 Confidence & Uncertainties

Overall Assessment Confidence

MODERATE-HIGH — with caveats on ground-truth access and RSF internal dynamics

Reason 1: Source quality

Multiple corroborating high-quality sources: ACLED conflict data, IPC famine assessments, UN FFM reports, Reuters ground reporting, HRW documentation. Core facts are robustly sourced.

Reason 2: Access constraints

Confidence is moderated by severe access restrictions in RSF-held territories. IPC itself acknowledges documented famine areas are likely a subset of actual conditions. Ground truth in Darfur is structurally unavailable.

Reason 3: Intent opacity

External actor intent — particularly UAE, Ethiopia, and Trump administration posture on Sudan — is assessed from behavioral signals, not confirmed policy documents. Intent assessments carry inherently lower confidence.

Three Uncertainties That Could Flip This Assessment:

Saudi-UAE rapprochement on Sudan: If the Gulf rift narrows — for example, through a Yemen-linked deal — both powers could jointly pressure their respective clients toward a ceasefire. This would dramatically change the diplomatic landscape and shift the scenario distribution toward Scenario A. Current assessment considers this unlikely but non-negligible (15-20%) within 90 days.
RSF internal fracture or command collapse: If Hemedti loses meaningful command authority over Darfur-based RSF factions — which are showing increased autonomy in atrocity patterns — the conflict could fragment into an ungovernable multi-actor war even harder to negotiate. Alternatively, a coup-within-coup scenario could produce a new RSF leadership more willing to negotiate. Either direction would invalidate current scenario probabilities.
US strategic re-engagement at high level: The Trump administration's actual Sudan posture remains ambiguous. If the US decides Sudan is a strategic priority — for Red Sea access, counter-Iran positioning, or regional stability — a shift toward assertive diplomacy and targeted coercion could rapidly alter the diplomatic landscape. Absence of this engagement is currently a structural assumption. If wrong, Scenario A probability rises significantly.

Assumption Failure Drill — Top 2 Assumptions and Failure Signals:

Assumption	Why It Matters	Failure Signal
The Saudi-UAE proxy rift will persist and prevent effective ceasefire pressure on both belligerents.	This is the primary reason Scenario A is assessed at only 10-15%. If the rift closes, ceasefire probability rises dramatically.	Joint Saudi-UAE diplomatic statement on Sudan; suspension of UAE arms flows confirmed by third-party monitoring; Saudi-UAE bilateral summit that addresses Sudan explicitly.
WFP operational collapse (end-March stock depletion) will not be prevented by emergency donor action.	Drives the humanitarian mortality timeline and Scenario C probability. If donors surge funding in March, the cliff is pushed back and humanitarian system partially stabilizes.	Emergency OCHA Flash Appeal achieving $500M+ within 14 days; WFP confirms new donor commitments covering Q2 operations; UAE or US translates pledges to immediately deployable WFP transfers.

09 References

[1] Wikipedia — Sudanese Civil War (2023-present), accessed 13 March 2026. Covers early 2026 Kordofan fighting, drone strikes, SAF-Khartoum recapture, Ethiopia camp reporting.
[2] Human Rights Watch — World Report 2026: Sudan, published February 4, 2026. War crimes documentation, sexual violence, SAF/RSF detention, ICC developments, sanction status.
[3] Security Council Report — Sudan, February 2026 Monthly Forecast, published February 1, 2026. UNSC dynamics, P5 divisions, SAF/RSF ceasefire posture.
[4] Amani Africa — Briefing on the Situation in Sudan, February 12, 2026. El Fasher fall, Kordofan front, proxy competition, Egyptian intervention, AU PSC dynamics.
[5] Al Jazeera — Sudan army renewing military effort to retake Kordofan, Darfur, January 12, 2026. SAF offensive planning, RSF El Obeid attacks, 1,000-day conflict milestone.
[6] Al Jazeera — Sudan's devastating war rages on as regional rivalries deepen, March 11, 2026. Crisis Group analysis; Saudi-UAE rift; Kordofan front lines; diplomatic landscape.
[7] Council on Foreign Relations — Global Conflict Tracker: Civil War in Sudan, accessed March 2026. Background and current status summary.
[8] Al Jazeera — Sudan protecting Africa from foreign interference, February 13, 2026. SAF FM statements at AU PSC; UAE denial; Saudi condemnation of foreign interference; AU membership status.
[9] Arab Center DC — Sudan's War: The Failure of Mediation and the Struggle for Civilian Rule, November 17, 2025. Dual-government structure; gold economy; partition dynamics; UN FFM findings.
[10] Foundation for Defense of Democracies — Sudanese Army Breaks Key Siege, February 5, 2026. Kadugli siege break; Egyptian military role; Turkish arms transfers; US strategy analysis.
[11] IOM — Sudan Crisis Response Plan 2026, accessed March 4, 2026. IDP figures; IOM operational capacity; local partner reach.
[12] IPS News — Sudan: World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis, March 4, 2026. UNICEF child malnutrition data; 1.3M children in famine zones; 770,000 expected severe acute malnutrition.
[13] CARE — Deepening Starvation in Sudan, February 5, 2026. IPC famine alert Um Baru and Kernoi; 33M in urgent need; 29M acutely food insecure; gender dimensions; funding gap (5.5% of $2.9B).
[14] UN News — Child malnutrition hits catastrophic levels in parts of Sudan, February 5, 2026. IPC assessment details; Greater Kordofan conditions; displacement figures.
[15] World Food Programme — Families in Sudan pushed to the brink, January 2026. WFP $700M requirement; food stock depletion timeline; 4M people reached monthly.
[16] World Food Programme — Famine in Sudan (emergency page), accessed March 2026. Confirmed famine locales; 20 additional at-risk areas; WFP operational scope.
[17] Action Against Hunger — Sudan Becomes the World's Hungriest Country, February 5, 2026. 5.5% funding figure; families eating once daily; access restrictions; lean season warning.

— Action Thresholds

Green — Monitor

Humanitarian response plan funding reaches 20%+. WFP stock depletion crisis bridged. Any confirmed ceasefire mechanism, even partial, takes effect. Saudi-UAE rift shows tangible signs of narrowing.

Amber — Act

WFP Q2 operations confirmed underfunded. SAF launches major Kordofan offensive with high civilian impact. New IPC famine confirmation in additional locales. Ethiopian-Sudanese border incident involving regular forces. Humanitarian worker attacks continue at current rate.

Red — Emergency Response

WFP operational collapse confirmed. Famine-related mortality spike detected in Q2 reporting. RSF attacks on Khartoum or major eastern cities. Ethiopia-Sudan armed exchange. Any further expansion of confirmed genocide conditions. Displacement exceeds 15 million total.

Current Status Assessment: AMBER-RED BOUNDARY • Multiple Amber indicators have already triggered. Red threshold on WFP collapse is days-to-weeks away without emergency action.

Sudan Conflict & Humanitarian CrisisCurrent Assessment — Q1 2026

Sudan Conflict & Humanitarian Crisis
Current Assessment — Q1 2026