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A QAP-compliant structured intelligence assessment of the March 2026 drone strike on eastern Chad, President Déby's complete border closure and standing retaliatory authorization, and the scenario pathways that will determine whether Chad slides from defensive posture into direct involvement in Sudan's civil war. Applies the full Quanta Analytica Process™ including Key Assumptions Check, ACH, scenario modeling, action thresholds, and WSI source audit. Confidence: Moderate. Classification: Unclassified / Open Source.

JNIM's expansion into Benin and Togo is a deliberate strategic push, not spillover — both states now sit on the active frontline of the jihadist southern advance. Togo recorded 52 deaths across ten attacks in 2024; Benin suffered 28 soldiers killed in early January 2025 alone. A thwarted coup attempt in Benin on 7 December 2025 — mounted by officers citing the deteriorating northern security situation — shows that external threat pressure is now activating internal political fractures. Both governments have defaulted to a security-heavy posture while neglecting the conditions that drive recruitment, generating diminishing returns and new grievances. JNIM has shifted toward territorial administration and governance competition, which conventional military responses alone cannot counter. Stability requires hardening the security perimeter in the short term while urgently investing in governance presence, economic integration, and community trust in the north. Confidence: Moderate. Classification: Unclassified / Open Source.

Sudan's civil war has entered a strategically decisive phase — the SAF has recaptured Khartoum and key Kordofan cities while the RSF holds Darfur and its parallel government. De facto partition is now operationally real. Famine is confirmed in Al Fasher and Kadugli with WFP food stocks to be depleted by end of March 2026, constituting an acute mass-casualty risk within weeks. The conflict has fully regionalised: Egypt conducts airstrikes for the SAF; the UAE finances the RSF; an Ethiopian training camp hosts ~4,300 RSF-aligned fighters; Saudi Arabia has abandoned mediation and is backing the SAF. The Saudi-UAE proxy rift structurally reduces ceasefire probability. The Kordofan front is the current operational center of gravity with near-daily RSF drone strikes on civilian infrastructure. The 2026 humanitarian response plan requires $2.9 billion and has received only 5.5% of required funding. No credible ceasefire mechanism exists. Overall threat level: 9/10 — Critical. Classification: Unclassified / For Policy Use.

Mauritania's institutional sabotage of its own anti-slavery laws is deliberate, not incidental — fewer than ten individuals have ever been imprisoned for hereditary slavery despite decades of criminalization. The TIP Tier 2 rating functions as a legitimacy shield, not a performance certification. Without conditionality applied to U.S. and EU assistance, managed stasis (60%) remains the overwhelming base case.

Sierra Leone scores zero on the GTI 2026, but fragile governance and entrenched informal economies position it as a high-risk passive node in West Africa's expanding illicit trafficking architecture.

State authority is functionally absent as armed gangs control ~90% of Port-au-Prince, while the UN-authorized Gang Suppression Force remains significantly underpowered and the August 2026 election timeline is at extreme risk.

Peace frameworks exist on paper while war persists on the ground; M23/AFC has consolidated parallel state structures, drone warfare has destabilized operations, and the humanitarian situation remains catastrophic amidst a funding collapse.

Mozambique faces simultaneous, mutually reinforcing shocks: an expanding insurgency, a post-electoral political rupture with nationwide protests, and deep structural economic fragility following significant U.S. aid cuts.

The Sahel remains the highest-risk zone due to junta-driven resource nationalism and insurgency, while a continental shift toward mineral export restrictions and US-China proxy contests in the DRC has structurally reshaped the investment landscape.

Suez transit remains structurally foreclosed for Western carriers through Q3 2026 due to the Iran-US conflict, while severe insurance deterioration and expanded OFAC sanctions exposure create significant unhedged risks for multinationals.